Explaining Sudden Stops, Growth Collapse and BOP Crises: The Case of Distortionary Output Taxes by Guillermo A. Calvo
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
EXPLAINING SUDDEN STOPS,
GROWTH COLLAPSE AND BOP CRISES:








I am grateful to Fernando Broner, Kevin Cowan, Alejandro Izquierdo, Michael Kumhof, Eduardo Levy-
Yeyati, Luis Fernando Mejía, Enrique Mendoza, Ned Phelps, Ernesto Talvi, and seminars participants at
IADB, Di Tella University and the University of Maryland for valuable comments.  This paper was prepared
for the Mundell-Fleming Lecture at the IMF Annual Research Conference, November 7, 2002.  I would like
to dedicate it to the memory of Rudi Dornbusch, whose insight, wit and whip inspired generations of scholars
and policymakers in International Finance and Development Economics. The views expressed herein are
those of the authors and not necessarily those of the National Bureau of Economic Research
©2003 by Guillermo A. Calvo.  All rights reserved. Short sections of text not to exceed two paragraphs, may
be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit including © notice, is given to the source.Explaining Sudden Stops, Growth Collapse and BOP Crises:
The Case of Distortionary Output Taxes
Guillermo A. Calvo
NBER Working Paper No. 9864
July 2003
JEL No. F3, F4
ABSTRACT
The paper discusses a model in which growth is a negative function of fiscal burden. Moreover,
growth discontinuously switches from high to low as fiscal burden reaches a critical level. Growth
collapse is associated with a Sudden Stop of capital inflows, real depreciation and a drop in output
(driven by a fall in the output of nontradables)-all of which have occurred during recent financial
crises in Emerging Markets. The monetary version of the model is employed to show that BOP
crises could be a result of fiscal distortions. In particular, it is further argued that BOP crisis could
be a justifiable central bank response to growth collapse, although realistic circumstances may make
this response highly ineffective. An important policy implication of the model is that in order to
avoid Sudden Stop crises, policymakers should aim at improving fiscal institutions. Lowering the
fiscal deficit is highly effective in the medium term, but could be counterproductive in the short run
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I.  Introduction 
Since Mexico’s Tequila Crisis of 1994/5, Emerging Market Economies, EM, have 
entered a period of recurrent crises that go far beyond currency crises as experienced in 
Advanced Economies.  EM crises are characterized by sharp recession, high 
unemployment, and  
(Insert Table 1 here) 
 
an alarming rise in the number of people living below the poverty line.  A common 
feature of these episodes is a Sudden Stop, SS, namely, a large reduction in the flow of 
international capital.
1 This is illustrated in Table 1 which, incidentally, shows that the 
phenomenon predates the Tequila.  Moreover, Calvo and Reinhart (2001) show that, on 
the whole, SS is absent in Advanced Countries.  This leads me to the conjecture that SS is 
perhaps the central feature of EM crises from which all the others follow.  Developing a 
theory that rationalizes the conjecture is a challenging task, because EM crises have not 
been preceded by sharply deteriorating fundamentals (see Calvo and Mendoza (1996 a 
and b) for the case of Mexico).  Thus, to model this fact the theory should ideally be able 
to display market equilibrium discontinuity as a function of market fundamentals. 
The basic model presented at the outset exhibits equilibrium discontinuity.  A key 
assumption is that government expenditure has to be partly financed by output taxes 
which, by their nature, lower the after-tax marginal value productivity of capital.  Thus, 
the larger is government expenditure, the lower will be the rate of growth.  There is a 
region, however, where high and low growth equilibria coexist.  The intuition for this is 
                                                           
1 The expression Sudden Stop was first suggested, and the phenomenon highlighted, in 
Dornbusch et al (1995).  
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straightforward: high (low) growth implies low (high) tax rates, sustaining high (low) 
growth.  The model assumes that International Financial Institutions, IFIs, will realize 
that equilibrium indeterminacy is all a matter of expectations, and will help to coordinate 
the high-growth equilibrium.  Thus, equilibrium is unique.
2 However, a discontinuity will 
take place at the point where multiplicity disappears, and only low growth can be 
sustained.  This happens in the model when government expenditure (summarized by the 
stock of public debt) which has to be serviced by output taxes reaches a critical level.  If 
the economy is near that critical level, seemingly minor accidents, like a deterioration of 
the terms of trade or an increase in country risk, could throw the economy into the region 
where only low growth is sustainable.  Moreover, since investment collapses, a SS will 
take place.  The model is then extended to account for nontradable or home goods.  In 
that context, it is shown that if the crisis contains an unanticipated component, then the 
SS will be accompanied by an increase in the real exchange rate (i.e., real devaluation).
3 
Finally, the model is extended to incorporate money in a cash-in-advance fashion. 
 Since money demand is positively correlated with aggregate demand, a collapse of the 
latter (discussed at the end of last paragraph) would bring about a drop in the demand for 
money.  Thus, if the exchange rate is fixed, international reserves will fall precipitously, 
resembling a BOP crisis.  The monetary economy is then employed to study optimal 
exchange rate policy in response to SS.  Since SS is, after all, a cut in total credit, it may 
                                                           
2 For an earlier attempt to rationalize SS on the basis of multiplicity of equilibria and in 
an essentially static non-monetary framework, see Calvo (1998 b). 
3 Real depreciation also takes place if the crisis is fully anticipated and it entails a higher 
consumption tax, for example.  
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be optimal for the central bank to release some of its international reserves (e.g., through 
credit subsidy) to relieve the impact of SS on the private sector, especially when the new 
credit conditions contain an important surprise element.  Under the usual rules that dictate 
the operation of a central bank, the latter can release reserves by expanding domestic 
credit and pegging the exchange rate (pure floating would not do because in that case 
international reserves will remain intact).  This reaction to SS has been quite common in 
EM.  Therefore, the central bank may end up precipitating the BOP crisis.  This policy, 
incidentally, is criticized in the paper by indicating that the recipients of central bank 
largesse may not be the intended target.  The paper argues that if policymakers 
understand this difficulty, they may be driven to experiment with heterodox policies (like 
directing credit to specific sectors). 
II.  Basic Model 
The basic structure of this model is taken from Calvo (1998 c) which, in turn, is a 
dynamic extension of Eaton (1987).  I will start by examining the case of an economy 
that produces tradable output by means of tradable capital, K.  The production function is 
linear homogeneous: one unit of output is produced by means of 1/α units of capital.  The 
net cash-flow, S, for a firm that accumulates capital at the rate K &  is given by (assuming 
away capital depreciation): 
() , 1 t t t K K S & − − = τ α      (1) 
where τ, 0 ≤  τ ≤  1, denotes the constant output tax rate.  Thus, denoting the constant 
international real interest rate (i.e., the own-rate of return on output) by r, the value of the 
firm at time zero, V, is given by  
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Notice, incidentally, that given linear technology z equals the rate of output growth. 
The firm is assumed to maximize V by choosing the growth path z, taking as 
given the international interest rate r, the tax rate τ, and the technological constraints.  A 
quick inspection of this problem shows that the optimum can be found among the 
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Differentiating the right-hand side of equation (4) with respect to z, yields 






τ α     (5) 
Therefore, as expected, the firm will grow as fast (slow) as possible if the net-of-tax 
marginal productivity of capital exceeds (falls short of) the rate of interest.  Thus, in order 
to obtain well-defined solutions, one must constraint z to a finite interval, and z < r.  
Concretely, I will assume that there exists some  0 > z  such that  . 0 r z z < ≤ ≤  Setting 0 
as the lower bound implies that capital cannot by unbolted; thus, the model belongs to the 
putty-clay family. 
The next step is to endogenize the tax rate τ.  I will assume that the government 
inherits a stock of debt D, a share θ of which has to be serviced by means of output taxes. 
 Again, assuming that the government has full access to capital markets, the tax rate τ  
  5 











ατ θ     (6) 
Thus, using equation (6) in expression (5), we get the following fundamental relationship: 
() [] . sgn sgn r z r D
z
V
− − − =
∂
∂
θ α     (7) 
Notice that the bracketed expression in equation (7) increases with z.  Thus, the Low 
Growth Equilibrium, LGE, i.e., z = 0, is possible if 
. 0 < − − r Dr θ α     (8) 
In other words, LGE exists if as firms set z = 0, they have no incentive, by expression (8), 
to revise their choice.  It is worth noting, however, that this does not rule out the 
existence of other equilibria. 
On the other hand, by a similar reasoning, the High Growth Equilibrium, HGE, 
i.e.,  , z z =  exists if 
() . 0 > − − − r z r D θ α     (9) 
The left-hand-side functions in expressions (8) and (9) are drawn in Figure 1.
4 
Clearly, LGE exists if θD > δ
1 = (α - r)/r, while HGE exists if θD < δ
2 = (α - r)/(r -  ). z  
Thus, indeterminacy exists in the interval (δ
1,δ
2).  However, coordination among 
investors could drive the economy to the HGE.  Success of this policy could be greatly 
aided by strong support from IFIs, requiring, in principle, no public sector resources.  
For, eliminating the bad LGE in the indeterminacy region is, in principle, a costless 
                                                           
4 The borderline cases in which (8) or (9) hold with equality are of no interest and will 
not be discussed here.  
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operation.  Thus, I will assume that if LGE and HGE coexist, the economy will always 
settle at the HGE.
5 
                                                           
5 In my view the IFI’s coordination role was successfully carried out in Mexico 1995, 
Korea 1997 and Brazil 1999, and helps to explain the rapid (V-shaped) recovery of those 
economies. 
(Insert Figure 1 here) 
Consequently, the model implies high growth if θD ≤  δ
2, and low growth 
(actually, zero growth) otherwise.  Equilibrium discontinuity (see Figure 2) is a key result 
because it helps to rationalize situations in which, all of a sudden, a roaring tiger becomes 
a whining pussycat.  This feature is, unfortunately, somewhat clouded in the present 
model, given that linear production functions generate, as a general rule, corner solutions. 
 Thus, the equilibrium discontinuity highlighted here may appear as a trivial and 
uninteresting proposition.  To dispel that view the Appendix will “smooth the edges” of 
this model by assuming adjustment costs to investment.  As shown there, under 
uniqueness, growth is a continuous and negative function of D.  It takes equilibrium 
multiplicity as depicted in the above model (prior to the equilibrium selection criterion 
adopted here, which in case of indeterminacy picks the one yielding the highest growth) 
to generate discontinuity.  Growth discontinuity takes place as the systems loses a good 
equilibrium and plunges to an equilibrium exhibiting lower growth.  Notice that, although 
equilibrium multiplicity is a necessary condition to obtain growth collapse, it is not 
sufficient.  For example, it is easy to construct examples exhibiting two equilibria in 
which equilibrium solutions converge to each other as debt goes up.  Thus, growth  
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collapse as depicted in the above model never takes place.  Instead, what one would have 
is a situation in which, except for a borderline case, the model yields two equilibria or 
none at all.  Therefore, the set of models that yield growth collapse are strictly included in 
those yielding equilibrium multiplicity (before imposing the equilibrium-selection 
criterion).  Thus, the existence of realistic examples yielding growth collapse cannot be 
taken for granted, which opens up an interesting research agenda. 
(Insert Figure 2 here) 
In what follows, I will continue the discussion in terms of the present model 
because SS and other interesting implications are the same as in the more complex model 
presented in the Appendix (except in the few instances in which it will be explicitly 
noted). 
The model or simple extensions provide interesting insights.  For example: 
•  Variable D represents all-encompassing public debt.  Therefore, it should include 
state-contingent public debt, like the one that surfaces during crises (see Diaz-
Alejandro (1985) for a detailed recount of how contingent public debt became 
apparent during Chile’s 1982/3 crisis, and Calvo, Izquierdo and Talvi (2002) for 
recent estimates).  State-contingent debt has proven to be large and to contain a 
sizable unanticipated component.  Thus, a SS could take place even though to the 
naked eye the economy appears safely ensconced within the high-growth region 
(i.e., far to the left of critical point δ
2). 
•  The critical debt level δ
2 is a function of the production parameter α.  Recalling 
Figure 1, it is clear that δ
2 declines as α falls.  A negative terms-of-trade shock  
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could be captured by a lower α.  Thus, a deterioration in the terms of trade could 
plunge the economy into the LGE, causing, as will be argued in the next section, a 
SS.  This observation, incidentally, shows that for economies that are near their 
critical debt levels, a relatively minor terms-of-trade deterioration can bring about 
a substantial decline in output growth. 
•  The model assumes that the government and the private sector have access to 
capital markets.  However, D could also stand for country-risk-adjusted public 
debt, in which case an increase in country risk implies a larger D.  Thus, even in 
the benign case in which the private sector is immune to country risk, θD could 
jump to the low growth region as a result of an increase in country risk.  This is 
relevant for rationalizing the effects of events like the Russian 1998 crisis (see 
Calvo (1998 a, and 1999), Calvo and Mendoza (2000)), which resulted in an 
increase in country risk all across EM, and appears to have left in its wake a 
noticeable growth slowdown in Latin America (see Calvo, Izquierdo and Talvi 
(2002)). 
•  Debt levels that can be sustained without inducing low growth, decline with the 
share of debt that has to be serviced on the basis of distortionary taxes (i.e., as θ 
increases).  Thus, if labor supply were inelastic, for example, it would be optimal 
to raise labor taxes and set θ = 0.  However, tax evasion may make this impossible 
or at least impractical.  This suggests the key role of tax reform and adequate 
fiscal institutions for growth and stability.  
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III.  Sudden Stop and Home Goods 
So far our discussion did not require any reference to utility functions, because in 
the model there is complete separation between production and consumption decisions.  
The latter is, in general, essential information to compute current accounts (and, hence, 
address the issue of SS) or model the behavior of the real exchange rate (which requires 
bringing to the picture home or nontradable goods). 
Suppose that there exists a representative individual whose utility function is 
time-separable, the subjective rate of discount is constant and (for simplicity) equal to the 
international rate of interest r.
6 The instant utility function will be denoted u(c,h), where c 
and h stand for consumption of tradable and home goods, respectively.  Output of home 
goods is described by a concave production function f(x), where x stands for input of 
tradables.  Functions u and f satisfy the standard regularity conditions.  The analysis will 
be centered on interior solutions. 
The above assumptions guarantee that optimal consumption of tradables and 
nontradables, and production of nontradables will be constant over time.  The budget 
constraint under these conditions boils down to 
() [] , 1 x c D V r + = − − θ     (10) 
where time subscripts are dropped because all paths are constant over time.  The square-
bracketed expression is net wealth after taking into account distortionary taxes (netted out 
from V) and non-distortionary taxes, (1 - θ)D.  Thus, the optimal (market equilibrium) 
                                                           
6 For a discussion of this model in the more general case in which the rate of discount is 
different from the international interest rate, see Calvo (1998 c).  The latter also addresses 
welfare issues and the impact of controls on capital outflows that will be skipped in the 
present paper.  
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consumption and production plan is obtained by solving the following problem: 
() [] () () . 1 , max c D V r f c u
c − − − θ     (11) 
Solving (11) yields the following familiar first-order condition, equating the marginal rate 
of substitution between tradables and nontradables and the respective marginal rate of 
transformation: 
() [] () ()
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    ( 1 2 )  
where p is the relative price of home goods with respect to tradables (i.e., the inverse of 
the real exchange rate).  By (12), equilibrium c and p are functions of net wealth.  
Moreover, by equations (4) and (6) 








θ     (13) 
Recalling that  , r z <  condition (9) for the existence of a HGE requires, that α > r.  Thus, 
by (13), V is an increasing function of z.  This can be employed to show, incidentally, 
that, if HGE and LGE coexist, then HGE Pareto dominates LGE, as expected. 
By equations (10) and (13), the Current Account (Surplus) at time 0, CA0, 




x c rD z CA
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− = − − − − ≡
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α     (14) 
Hence, CA0 < 0 on HGE and CA0 = 0 on LGE.  Consequently, as the economy switches 
from high to low growth, the current account deficit exhibits a discontinuous collapse to 
zero.  Thus, SS takes place, since a non-monetary economy like the present one, -CA0 = 
Capital Inflows at time 0.  Moreover, assuming that consumption of nontradables is a  
  11 
“normal” good, it follows that, given p, consumption of nontradables falls as net wealth 
(i.e., V - (1 - θ)D) declines.  Therefore, by equation (12), as growth collapses, x falls and 
f’(x) rises, implying that the SS would be accompanied by real depreciation (i.e., p falls). 
 Clearly, in this case GDP will also collapse because the output of nontradables falls.  All 
of these results are fully in line with empirical observations (see Calvo and Reinhart 
(2000), and Calvo, Izquierdo and Talvi (2002)). 
1.  Money.  The model can easily be extended to a monetary economy.  For example, 
suppose the demand for money is subject to a cash-in-advance constraint, such that 
() , money   nominal for    demand ph c E M
d + = ≡     ( 1 5 )
where E is the nominal exchange rate (i.e., the price of foreign exchange in terms of 
domestic currency).  Thus, first-order conditions (12) remain intact and, if the 
representative individual internalizes the government budget constraint, one can show 
that money is superneutral, in the sense that, along steady states, the real side of the 
economy is invariant to the presence of money. 
Thus, recalling that under the crisis scenario highlighted above (i.e., D 
unexpectedly moves from the high to the low growth region) c + ph declines, it follows 
that, given E, the demand for money will exhibit a discontinuous fall.  Consider the case 
in which E is fixed.  Therefore, the SS will be associated with an unexpected drop in 
international reserves.  If the latter is high enough, a BOP crisis would ensue.  Notice that 
the model gives an anti-Krugman rationale for the BOP crisis (Krugman (1979)).  The 
crisis in the present model is entirely rooted in real factors: SS comes first, BOP follows. 
 Policy implications are also very different.  For example, Krugman crises can be  
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prevented by following a tighter fiscal policy, whereas in the present model tighter fiscal 
policy (if based on higher tax rates) could actually trigger the crisis.  Not because fiscal 
balance is undesirable, but because the instruments to achieve it are distorting! Once 
again, what the present model highlights is the importance of improving fiscal 
institutions. 
2.  Anticipated Crises.  Although I believe SSs contain a significant unanticipated 
component, the present model can also rationalize the case in which a SS is fully 
anticipated.  In the first place, notice that, in general, investment decisions are predicated 
on 
() () . 1 1 sgn  

 




s ds e τ α     (16) 
The integral in expression (16) equals the present discounted value of net-of-taxes return 
on a unit of investment.  Thus, investment will take place when the latter exceeds its cost 
(= 1), i.e., when the sign in expression (16) is positive; moreover, if (16) is negative, no 
investment will occur.  As expected, when τ is constant expression (16) boils down to (5). 
 Consider now the situation in which from time 0 to T debt is zero, but everyone knows 
that at time T the public sector will be loaded with debt θD = δ
2 + ε (where, it should be 
recalled, δ
2 is the critical level of distortionary debt beyond which low growth is the only 
equilibrium solution, recall Figures 1 and 2, and ε is a positive number).  Moreover, 
suppose that on the interval (0,T] the tax rate τ = 0; afterwards, τ is set at a constant level 
necessary to service debt D.  One can easily show that as ε converges to 0, investment 
will be set at its maximum level in the interval (0,T], and zt = 0, for t > T.  Thus, a fully 
anticipated growth collapse at time T would take place.  Will this result in a SS? Since the  
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growth crisis is fully anticipated and consumers have access to the capital market (and are 
not subject to taxes that distort the consumption time profile), consumption will remain 
undisturbed.  However, investment will go from  t K z  to zero.  Therefore, at the onset of 
the growth crisis, a SS will take place.
7 
In what follows I will show how to construct a monetary example which would be 
a polar opposite to Krugman’s (1979).  Suppose that the economy starts with zero debt, a 
positive fiscal deficit, and zero distorting taxes, τ.  Clearly, debt will be increasing 
throughout time and, if policy remains the same, it will eventually reach the critical level 
δ
2.  At this juncture, the government eliminates fiscal deficit by resorting to the inflation 
tax to cover the primary deficit (as in Krugman (1979), and services the outstanding debt 
as in Section II (i.e., employing distorting taxes).  Obviously, the economy will display 
high growth until net output-distorting debt reaches the critical level δ
2, and then switch 
to low growth forever.
8 The monetary economy under fixed rates will again display a 
sudden loss of international reserves at crisis, reflecting the effect of anticipated inflation 
(as in Calvo (1987)).  One could even generate a BOP crisis a la Krugman (1979) if 
public debt includes (with a negative sign) international reserves.  If, for example, the 
critical minimum level of reserves is zero, it can be shown that the crisis coincides with 
full depletion of international reserves, in conjunction with a run against the domestic 
                                                           
7 This does not hold true in the Appendix model because in the latter investment is a 
continuous function of time.  However, even though investment does not display a 
discontinuous fall, it will show a declining trend. 
8 Again, this does not follow in the Appendix model, in which a lower growth is attained 
in a continuous manner.  
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currency.  Once again, however, the BOP crisis is inherently real.
9 
The following points are worth making: 
•  As explained, real depreciation follows from an unanticipated SS, not the other 
way around.  However, given the tendency to focus on exchange rates, a casual 
observer might conclude that the main culprit was currency over-appreciation.  
As “proof” she will likely point out that the real exchange rate shows no sign to 
return to its prior-to-crisis level. 
                                                           
9 Contrary to this scenario, however, most recent BOP crises seem to have been driven 
more by an expansion of domestic credit from the central bank than by a fall in the 
demand for monetary aggregates (see Flood, Garber and Kramer (1996), Kumhof (2000), 
Calvo (2001)).  This issue will be taken up in the next section. 
•  Suppose the utility function u is homothetic in tradables and nontradables.  Hence, 
given p, the demand for nontradables, h, is proportional to the demand for 
tradables, c.  In particular, during a SS and, given p, the demand for nontradables 
falls in the same proportion as the demand for tradables.  Let us focus on the case 
in which the current account deficit, CAD, becomes zero.  Then, given CAD, the 
smaller is the domestic supply of tradables (net of international debt and 
precommitted transfers) in terms of tradables’ consumption, ω, the larger will be 
the proportional drop in c at SS.  Consequently, the smaller is ω, the larger will be 
the fall in c and h (given p) caused by the SS.  Variable ω measures the 
economy’s ability to supply domestic absorption of tradables.  In Calvo, Izquierdo 
and Talvi (2002), variable ω is called “un-leveraged absorption of tradable  
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goods;” ω is shown to vary widely across countries (Argentina and Brazil are 
shown to have one of the lowest ω).  Therefore, the same CAD adjustment could 
have significant differences across countries depending on ω. 
•  In this model, crises are very tame.  There is no room for default, for example.  
However, this can be easily rectified assuming, for instance, that the government 
repays only if the default alternative would be more costly.  One can show that, 
abstracting from direct default costs, on the low-growth region the default 
alternative dominates low growth plus full debt repayment.  Thus, (1) even if 
government is not intent on driving debt beyond the critical level, a bit of 
uncertainty will generate country risk premia, and (2) in the anti-Krugman 
example, in which sooner or later the critical threshold is crossed, the critical 
threshold will be zero.  To see this, note that if it was positive and equal to  , D  for 
example, then investors will stop lending before D reaches  . D  Otherwise, the 
“last” loan before reaching D  will immediately be declared in default, a hardly 
attractive investment proposition.  However, a positive D  could be generated if 
there are direct default costs (a realistic assumption). 
•  The model assumes that output of home goods falls as the cost of raw materials 
rises or, equivalently, as the real exchange rate rises (i.e., as the relative price of 
home goods with respect to tradables p falls).  In actuality, however, another 
important factor in nontradables’ output contraction during a crisis is Liability 
Dollarization, i.e., the existence of debt denominated in terms of tradables (dollar  
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debt, for short).
10 Under these conditions, for example, an unanticipated SS could 
give rise to bankruptcies in the home goods sector, resulting in momentarily lower 
output.  How deep and persistent is the output collapse will depend on bankruptcy 
legislation and the efficiency of the judicial system, and, of course, it will also 
depend on how much dollar-indebted is the home goods sector.  The latter, 
incidentally, could be especially large after a capital inflow episode like the one 
that occurred in EM during the first half of the 1990s. 
•  The weaker the enforceability of financial contracts, the more likely will be that 
loans impose collateral constraints, by which the value of attachable assets 
cannot fall short of a predetermined proportion of the loan.  Thus, it has become 
popular to assume that the loans a firm/individual can take depend on some 
measure of net worth.
11 Thus, if the collateral constraint is binding, a depreciation 
of the real exchange rate, i.e., a fall in p, may call for liquidation of productive 
assets.  If we further assume, following Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), that the 
liquidated assets will go to less efficient hands, then output will suffer a 
contraction.  Thus, a crisis could display a fall in output of nontradables even 
though, in principle, output would be perfectly price inelastic in absence of the 
financial shock.  Output contraction by this channel does not even require 
bankruptcy to take place.  At any rate, however, these extensions show that the 
                                                           
10 This is one of the key new topics in the EM literature.  See, for example, Calvo (2001), 
Jeane (2001). 
11 This line of research has been pioneered by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) for the closed 
economy, and extended to the open economy by Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001 a, b 
and 2003), Izquierdo (2000), and others.  
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financial channel could add to the depth and persistence of the crisis (see Diaz-
Alejandro (1985)).  Whereas raw materials are flows, financial obligations are 
stocks.  A stock reversal could actually cause much more damage than a flow cost 
increase, particularly if the latter is deemed to be temporary. 
IV.  Sudden Stop and Monetary Policy 
I will conduct the discussion taking as background the previous section’s model, 
focusing on the case in which the SS is largely unanticipated, and causes a credit crunch 
in the home-goods sector (due to, for instance, collateral constraints or margin calls).
12 
The analysis will center on policies taken after SS, and also policies that can be 
implemented before SS to cushion its deleterious effects.  Clearly, in this model credit is 
cut because outstanding credit is too large relative to the economy’s capacity to repay.  
Thus, only policies that have an impact on the latter will have a chance of becoming 
effective.  Monetary policy can influence the ability to repay in at least two different 
ways: (1) managing international reserves, and (2) changing relative prices in the face of 
price/wage stickiness. 
1.  Management of International Reserves.  A common feature in recent crises is a large 
expansion of domestic credit from the central bank.  As pointed out by Flood, Garber and 
Kramer (1996) and Kumhof (2000), this feature is not captured by the first-generation 
Krugman-Flood Garber models (see Krugman (1979), Flood and Garber (1994)).  In the 
latter the crisis is triggered by a sudden decline in the demand for domestic money.  
Actually, as illustrated by the Tequila crisis (see Calvo and Mendoza (1996 b)), in most 
                                                           
12 Thus, this section departs from the basic model in Section II, and is more speculative 
than earlier sections.  
  18 
cases (Argentina and Hong Kong are exceptions) the loss of international reserves is 
almost entirely driven by domestic credit.  The demand for domestic money shows no 
atypical decline.  Can one find a rationale for that? 
The following accounting identity is worth recalling: 
, R CAD KI ∆ + =     (17)
where “errors and omissions” are ignored, and KI, CAD, and ∆R stand for, respectively, 
capital inflows, current account deficit and accumulation of international reserves, R.  A 
SS is reflected in a sharp drop in KI.  If the central bank lets the exchange rate float, then 
no reserves will be lost, and the entire adjustment will fall on the current account, calling 
for a sharp real depreciation (a sharp fall in p, in the model’s notation).  This, in turn, 
might provoke sizable income redistribution, including bankruptcies in the nontradable 
sector.  Thus, the central bank will have incentives to follow an expansionary policy that 
places some of its international reserves in private hands (the nontradable sector’s, if the 
main objective is bankruptcy prevention).  Pure floating cannot work, because the central 
bank would not be able to release its reserves (unless they are directly transferred to the 
fiscal authority).  Therefore, under standard practices the central bank will be forced to 
adopt some kind of pegging accompanied by domestic credit expansion (hopefully before 
domestic money holders wise up to the impending crisis).  This rationalizes the fact 
(observed in Mexico 1994/5 and Brazil 1998/9) that the SS occurs first, and it is later 
followed by a currency crisis provoked by the central bank (not only by panicky domestic 
money holders).
13 Thus, devaluation follows the SS.  Since the latter is contractionary, 
                                                           
13 This requires changing the anti-Krugman example in Section III to allow for the central 
bank to issue domestic credit in response to a SS.  Central bank hyperactivity during BOP  
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this analysis also provides a rationale for contractionary devaluation, a well-known 
phenomenon in developing countries (see Diaz-Alejandro (1963), Sebastian Edwards 
(1989)).  Notice, however, that under this interpretation, output contraction is not the 
result of devaluation: SS would be. 
This discussion highlights the possible desirability of pegging the exchange rate 
once a SS is detected.  Exchange rate pegging allows the central bank transfer to the 
private sector its international reserves.
14 Is pegging responsible for the crisis in a deeper 
sense? I would not deny the possibility, but the present model shows that the roots of a 
SS may rest on fiscal dysfunction and be totally divorced from exchange rate policy. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
crises, incidentally, is a widely observed fact, as noted by Flood, Garber, and Kramer 
(1996) and Kumhof (2000). 
14 Once again, this policy would be especially relevant if the private sector suffers a credit 
crunch.  Brazil offers a recent example of this kind of central bank policy, see Financial 
Times (2002). 
Is central bank credit the best way to help the private sector during a SS? I have 
some serious doubts, because the new domestic credit will likely go to the public sector 
(slowing down desirable adjustment in government expenditure), and firms that have 
access to international credit markets (multinationals).  The latter, in particular, are likely 
to use additional domestic credit to unwind their dollar debts, an attractive proposition in 
view of impending devaluation, and that central bank credit expansion may momentarily 
push domestic interest rates for prime borrowers below market equilibrium.  Thus, it is  
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conceivable that domestic credit expansion drains international reserves from the central 
bank without substantially relieving the pressure on the current account.  This bleak 
scenario, which unfortunately appears not to be uncommon, helps to explain why during 
a SS, governments might be driven to adopt heterodox policies.  For example, controls on 
capital outflows (e.g., Malaysia 1998), socialization of private debts (e.g., Chile 1982/3, 
see Diaz-Alejandro (1985)), or controls on the direction of bank credit (Brazil 2002). 
A serious difficulty with heterodox policies is that, as a general rule, they imply 
breaking established rules or implicit contracts, opening up the door for time 
inconsistency and political economy maneuvers, specifically Wars of Attrition where 
different groups vie to benefit from central bank credit (see Sturzenegger and Tommasi 
(1998)).  Wars of Attrition result in policymaking paralysis, becoming very hard to know 
which side will win.  The policy impasse, in turn, increases the option value of waiting, 
which results in further investment and credit contraction− and declining growth (see 
Calvo (2002)).   
One way to get a better outcome might be for the government to offer (or support) 
exchange rate hedge contracts that will be activated the moment a large devaluation 
takes place.  In this fashion, the loss of reserves would be automatic, helping to 
ameliorate the after-crisis tug-of-war.  It should be noted, however, that government 
hedges may end up being underpriced, because their price reflects, in part, the 
government’s assessment of the likelihood of crisis.  Thus, in order to show the 
authorities’ high confidence in current policies, unrealistically cheap hedges may be 
offered, increasing the fiscal cost of a crisis and, in terms of the above model, also the  
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likelihood of crisis (because contingent net public debt goes up). 
2.  Wage/Price Stickiness.  This phenomenon lies at the heart of the literature on optimal 
exchange rate regimes and Optimal Currency Areas (e.g., Flood and Marion (1982); 
Calvo (2001) for a critical assessment).  A standard result is that if the economy is hit by 
a real shock, it is optimal to let the exchange rate free to float.  Thus, since a SS is 
essentially a real shock, one might reason that floating would be optimal− at least, until 
the dust settles.
15 
Let me first note that, in practice, the choice between fixed and floating exchange 
rate regimes in the aftermath of a SS often turns out to be just an academic exercise.  
Many economies are swept away by events and end up devaluing their currencies before 
the exchange rate issue is even raised! However, Argentina and Hong Kong in 1995 are 
interesting counterexamples.  These economies were able to maintain their Currency 
Board regimes despite massive loss of international reserves.  At any rate, the issue that I 
would like to raise is whether, subject to having enough international reserves, it may be 
socially desirable to keep a peg a little longer after a SS, in order to slowdown the relative 
price adjustment. 
As noted, SSs call for sharp changes in relative prices (often involving a real 
currency depreciation, a fall in p).  Thus, firms saddled with dollar debts, may be forced 
into costly asset liquidation or outright bankruptcy.  Quick convergence to the new set of 
equilibrium relative prices will bring this situation into the open, and financial chaos 
                                                           
15 In actuality, however, as shown in the earlier discussion of the monetary economy, a 
SS gives rise to both real and nominal shocks.  Thus, if anything, the standard literature 
would call for dirty float.  
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might ensue.  Could a temporary peg make a difference? The instinctive answer is 
probably “no” because, otherwise, sectors that should see their equilibrium relative price 
fall, would instead see their quantities contract− resulting in a wash at best.  However, this 
intuition misses and important point, namely, the microeconomics of price setting.  To 
illustrate, suppose that prices are set in a highly competitive environment, such that, 
under normal circumstances, profits are near zero.  Thus, a shock that set initial home 
good prices above their new full equilibrium level, is observationally equivalent to firms 
colluding and setting their prices at a higher-than-competitive-equilibrium level.  Output 
will fall but firms’ profits may rise.  This is not always the case but, in the present 
context, it is a definite possibility.  Therefore, relative price stickiness (brought about by 
price stickiness plus an exchange rate peg) may help to relieve financial stress.
16 
Consequently, the existence of price-stickiness may be another reason in favor of pegging 
in response to a SS. 
V.  Final Remarks 
•  The central message of the paper is that currency crises in EM may just be a 
sideshow, and that the key factors behind the collapse of economic activity and 
growth may stem from dysfunctional domestic policies and serious financial 
vulnerabilities.  The latter give rise to sharp changes in market equilibrium in 
response to relatively minor real shocks.  Thus, BOP crises could just be one of 
the many deleterious effects of a SS. 
•  The model is silent about the factors that trigger a SS.  Any shock that pushes the 
                                                           
16 For an example in terms of a micro-founded staggered-prices model, see Calvo (2000).  
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economy beyond the critical debt level would trigger a SS.  It could be an external 
factor, as Calvo, Izquierdo and Talvi (2002) claimed it was the case recently in 
Argentina, but it could also be an internal factor, like a domestic political or 
corporate governance scandal. 
•  The main policy lesson from the model is that EM should strive to improving 
fiscal and financial institutions.  But, perhaps equally important, policymakers 
should get ready for the possibility of a SS.  They should go through SS drills, 
much as well-run buildings go through fire drills.  Under normal circumstances, 
fires are low probability events.  However, if not well managed, the resulting 
stampede may dramatically increase the number of casualties. 
•  As noted, IFIs have a big role to play in coordinating high growth when both high 
and low growth coexist.  Actually, if the model is not misleading, before reaching 
a SS, there is always a region of indeterminacy in which IFIs could play that role. 
 Outside that region, however, the situation becomes more complicated, because 
most EM do not qualify for grants (as opposed to loans) from IFIs in response to 
debt crises (HIPCs are the exception).  Moreover, the G 7 have expressed serious 
concern about Moral Hazard implications of bailout packages.
17 
                                                           
17 For a critical assessment of the Moral Hazard view in connection with recent EM 
crises, see Calvo (2002). 
•  Still, IFIs could play a useful role as coordinators of private sector bail-ins, and 
enforcers of fiscal reform.  The former would lower the level of public debt, thus 
pushing the economy into the high-growth region.  Fiscal reform could also be  
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very effective if it helps to lower tax distortions (e.g., θ in the present model).  If 
countries are left on their own, these reforms may be hard to implement, because 
of political reasons.  In the Basic Model in Section II, for example, fiscal 
tightening would be effective if it relies on lowering government expenditure in a 
credible and sustainable manner, which is usually tangled with serious political 
economy problems.  IFIs could help to break the stalemate by offering “Loans for 
Reform.” If successful, the loans will be fully repaid because fiscal reform would 
place the economy on the high-growth path. 
•  However, the model suggests that outside the high-growth region, simple-minded 
belt-tightening fiscal programs, relying on higher taxes, could be 
counterproductive in the short run. 
•  Thus, a literal reading of the model shows that a tax hike will have no effect, 
given that, in principle, it does nothing about total public debt, D, or its 
distortionary impact, θ.  However, higher taxes may help to bring the 
economy back to high growth.  The hard question in this respect is whether a 
belt-tightening policy will enjoy political support during the transition in 
which pain is not immediately rewarded by high growth. 
•  Often during crises tax hikes rely on taxes that are non-distortionary in the 
short run (i.e., wealth taxes, and, in general, taxes on “sitting ducks”), but 
which would be highly distortionary if agents anticipated their continuation in 
the future.  Therefore, these taxes are effective if policymakers can credibly 
ensure the private sector that they will be eliminated as soon as the emergency  
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situation blows over.  Conceivably, IFIs could help to reinforce credibility in 
this context, although I am highly skeptical: in the future there will likely be a 
new set of policymakers both in the world at large, and the country in 
question− making enforceability extremely difficult. 
•  Finally, a technical note.  The paper shows that SSs can be both anticipated or 
unanticipated.  My conjecture, though, is that SSs contain a large element of 
surprise, and that the recent episodes have a lot to do with the Russian 1998 crisis, 
and resulting perception that EM securities constitute a much more risky asset 
class than previously thought.  However, this should not be read as belittling the 
relevance of domestic factors.  On the contrary, as the model shows, the critical 
debt level is intimately related to domestic institutions.  Moreover, given the 
strong non-linearities implied by the model, domestic factors could be powerful 
multipliers of external shocks.  The problem for the econometrician is that non-
linearities imply that, faced with the same external shock, some economies enter 
into deep crisis, while others escape totally unscathed.  Moreover, those that are 
drawn into crisis will likely trigger additional domestic factors that contribute to 
the depth of the crisis (like political instability).  Thus, the econometrician could 
wrongly infer that domestic factors are the sole determinants of these crises.  
Furthermore, if the number of crisis countries is small (e.g., at the time of writing, 
Argentina was the only large Latin American country that went into deep crisis 
after the Russian shock), empirical estimates will suffer from well-known small-
sample problems.  
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Appendix 
The main purpose of this section is to show that the SS follows from the existence 
of tax distortions and not from the knife-edge feature of the model in the text.  With that 
in mind, I will modify the previous model and assume that investment is subject to 
adjustment costs.  More concretely, I will assume that the output cost per unit of capital 
associated with capital growth z is portrayed by φ(z), where function φ is strictly convex 
and twice-continuously differentiable (implying φ″  > 0).  Notice, incidentally, that in the 
text I assume φ(z) = z.  Thus, to stay close to that model in a neighborhood of 0, I will 
further assume φ(0) = 0, and φ′ (0) = 1; moreover, I will assume that there exists z and  z  
such that z < 0 < , r z <  such that φ is defined on that open interval, and lim φ′ (z) = ∞  as z 
converges to  z  from the left, while lim φ′ (z) = -∞  as z converges to z from the right.  
Moreover, to simplify the analysis, I make the realistic assumption that lim φ(z) as z 
converges to z from the right is finite (specifically, it does not converge to ∞ ). 
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Thus, first-order conditions are sufficient for a maximum of V with respect to z, because  
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V does not contain a local minimum. 
Plugging budget constraint (6) to substitute for τ in (19), we get 
()( )( ) () [] () . , ' D z J z r z z z r D ≡ − + − − − ϕ ϕ θ α     ( 2 1 )  
Previous assumptions ensure that J(z,D) converges to ∞  as z goes to z from the right, and 
to -∞  as z goes to z  from the left.  Hence, equilibrium existence is ensured for all D.  It 
can further be shown, by (21), that Jz(z,0) < 0 for all z ∈  (z, ). z  Thus, equilibrium is 
unique for D = 0.  This result should not surprise us because if D = 0, there is no 
distortionary taxation.  Moreover, as a general rule, under uniqueness, equilibrium is a 
continuous function of D.  This shows that in order to get the SS discontinuities discussed 
in the text, it is, as a general rule, necessary for the model to exhibit multiple equilibria 
(before imposing the equilibrium-selection principle according to which the economy 
settles on the highest-growth equilibrium). 
I will now show an example where equilibrium is not unique (in absence of the 
equilibrium-selection principle).  By (21), and recalling that φ(0) = 0 and φ′  (0) = 1, we 
have 
() . , 0 r Dr D J − − = θ α    (22) 
Let D
c be such that J(0,D
c) = 0.  This implies that if D = D
c, then z = 0 maximizes the 
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Moreover, by (21) and (22), at D = D
c, 
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Hence, given r, for α sufficiently large or  () 0 ' ' ϕ  sufficiently small, we can ensure that 
Jz(0, D
c) > 0.  Thus, drawing the J function, given D, under these conditions readily 
shows that, if D = D
c, the economy will exhibit at least three equilibrium solutions 
(illustrated by the solid line in Figure 3).  Moreover, by (21), the J function shifts down 
as D increases.  Hence, there exists some 
c D D >  such that J(z, D ) < 0 for all z ∈ [ ). , 0 z  
However, the “bad” negative growth equilibrium is never lost (illustrated by the dashed 
line in Figure 3).  This implies that there will be some critical D (equivalent to δ
2/θ in the 
main text’s model) such that a growth collapse, SS, etc., will take place even if D suffers 
a slight increase.  Moreover, since the richer model could depict any number of 
equilibria, there could be succession of SSs as D increases. 
In closing, notice that the share of distorting debt in output at time zero, θD
c/α, 






c α α θ
−
=     (25) 
Thus, distorting debt in the multiple-equilibria example can be made as small a share of 
output as desired by selecting α sufficiently close to r, and α > r.  This shows that the 
example does not require unrealistically high debt ratios. 
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Table 1.  Sudden Stop 
Country/Episode  SS (% of GDP) 
Argentina, 1982-83  20 
Argentina, 1994-95  4 
Chile, 1981-83  7 
Chile 
1, 1990-91  8 
Ecuador, 1995-96  19 
Hungary, 1995-96  7 
Indonesia, 1996-97  5 
Malaysia 
1, 1993-94  15 
Mexico, 1981-83  12 
Mexico, 1993-95  6 
Philippines, 1996-97  7 
Venezuela, 1992-94  9 
South Korea, 1996-97  11 
Thailand, 1996-97  26 
Turkey, 1993-94  10 
Sources: Calvo and Reinhart (2000), from World Bank, World Debt Tables, various issues and Institute for 
International Economics, Comparative Statistics for Emerging market Economies, 1998. 
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